BALANCING POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY: GERMAN PARLIAMENTARIANISM'S RELEVANCE FOR SRI LANKA

Abstract

This article delves into the multifaceted landscape of political governance, focusing on the transformation of Sri Lanka's parliamentary system and the imperative quest for simultaneous elections. The trajectory of Sri Lanka's parliamentary evolution, from its inception as a key democratic institution to its peripheral status under semi-presidentialism, is illuminated. The call for simultaneous elections, advocated by organizations like the National Institution for Transforming India Aayog ("NITI Aayog"), aims to streamline administrative disruptions attributed to staggered elections. To facilitate this transition, mechanisms like constructive no-confidence votes and fixed-term legislatures have been proposed. Drawing from Germany's distinctive limited parliamentarianism, this study explores the potential for Sri Lanka's Parliament to regain centrality in its democracy. Germany's Basic Law, with its robust checks and balances and prudent regulation of political parties, serves as a compelling case study. However, caution is advised, as excessive inflexibility might jeopardize democratic ideals and parliamentary functionality. A novel approach is proposed, aligning objectives without compromising the fluidity of legislative periods and the integrity of a parliamentary democracy. The article undertakes a comprehensive comparative analysis of diverse constitutional governance models and their implications for accountability. Sri Lanka's experimentation with these concepts is examined in depth. Ackerman's concept of restricted parliamentarianism is expounded, juxtaposed with the distinctive legislative facets of German limited parliamentarianism.

Elections, as a cornerstone of democracy, enable citizens to exercise their franchise and demand accountability. India, the world's most populous democracy, is grappling with the notion of simultaneous elections. The article scrutinizes the Law Commission of India's recommendation for synchronized elections, exploring fixed-term legislatures and constructive votes of no-confidence as instruments of change. Critical features of the proposed scheme are unveiled, highlighting the interconnections that bind its components. Analyzing the repercussions of simultaneous elections on policy-making, the Model Code of Conduct, administrative efficacy, electoral violence, communal tensions, expenditure, and corruption, the study navigates through the intricacies of electoral dynamics. It examines how regional parties and down-ballot elections are influenced by simultaneity, probing accountability dimensions and the potential for personalization in the voting process. Conclusions reveal that simultaneity can be achieved without the accountability drawbacks of fixed terms and stability-driven strategies. Proposals are tendered for simultaneous elections, preserving governmental accountability through constructive voting and calibrated terms. Embracing flexible legislative periods, which harmonize with election cycles, emerges as a viable strategy, upholding simultaneity while preserving adaptability and accountability.